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It is generally thought that competitive equilibrium in sports leagues involves too little
competitive balance (the strong dominate the weak too much- a more even contest would be
more attractive). However, it is possible to sow in a standard logit contest model that the reverse
is true – the strong do not win “enough”- i.e. more wins by the strong team would increase
attendance or revenues. This is consistent with Hirshleifer’s paradox of power. However, this is
only true so long as the strong do not become too dominant- otherwise the regime switches to
one of pre-emption: the strong never lose. This paper identifies the conditions under which the
paradox of power and pre-emption will manifest themselves.
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This paper develops a simple model to illustrate Hirschleifer’s “paradox of power”. Applied in the 
context of a sports league, this means that teams which have greater potential to draw fans will in 
end up with less success than would be optimal from the league’s point of view, because the weak 
teams “try too hard”. The model is developed on the following assumptions: 
 
1.  There are only two teams in a league 
2.  Team owners maximise profits 
3.  The revenue function for each team depends upon win percentage (w), where w1 + w2 = 1 
4.  Team 1’s revenue function is (σ - w1) w1, team 2’s revenue function is (1 - w2) w2 where σ 
> 1, meaning that team 1 can generate a higher revenue than team 2 for any given level of 
win percentage. 
5.  Win percentage depends on each team’s share of total talent employed (T
D), according to 







= where t1 + t2 = T
D. 
6.  Talent undifferentiated and perfectly divisible.  
 
 
2. Competitive Equilibrium 
 
From these assumptions it follows that we can write the profit function for each team as:  
 
(1)   π1 = (σ - w1) w1 – ct1 ,  π2 = (1 - w2) w2 – ct2 , σ > 1 
 
Here “c” is the marginal cost of talent. If we assume the supply of talent is fixed (as is conventional 
in models of the US major leagues), then marginal cost must adjust to ensure that supply and 
demand are equal in equilibrium. If the supply of talent were perfectly elastic (an assumption that 
seems closer to the reality of European soccer leagues), then marginal cost must equal the 
reservation wage. We illustrate this point after deriving the equilibrium demands. 
 





















Hence the first order conditions for profits to be a maximum (from (1)) are 
 




∂π  = (σ - 2w1) w2  - cT





 = (1 - 2w2) w1  - cT
D = 0 
 
If we subtract the first order condition for team 2 from the first order condition for team 1 and 
rearrange terms we can easily derive the following expression for the win percentages at the Nash 
equilibrium 
 
(4)  w1* = σ / (1 + σ),   w2* = 1 / (1 + σ) 
 
We can estimate the demand for talent for each team simply by rewriting (3) in terms of talent 
rather than wins: 
 

























































note also, using (4) that in equilibrium  
 












































From which we can solve for team 2’s demand for talent: 











=     
 
and from which it follows that  
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and therefore total demand T












= + =  
 
We can consider now the two polar cases of a fixed labour supply (US model) and an elastic labour 
supply (European model). 
 
Case 1: fixed labour supply. 
 
If the labour supply is fixed then demand must adjust to meet that fixed supply. In the model the 
only way that can happen is through the adjustment of the marginal cost of labour. This is illustrated 










Figure 1: Inelastic labour supply 
 






S   5
(11)     S T











Case 2: perfectly elastic labour supply 
 
In this case, talent will be available at a constant marginal cost equal to its reservation wage r, and   
 






















Figure 2: Elastic labour supply 
 
 
Note that in this model the elasticity of supply has no effect on total profits, even though it affects 
the marginal cost of talent. To see why this is so, note that in the talent demand equations (8) and 
(9) the marginal cost of talent appears in the denominator. When we substitute this expression into 
the profit equations (1), the marginal cost cancels out. Hence increasing the wage rate reduces 
demand for talent but does not reduce profits. Profits depend only on the asymmetry parameter σ, 
and using (1), (4), (8) and (9) we can show that profit for each team equals 
 
(13)   3 2 3
2 2
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3. Two implications of the model. 
 
Implication 1: inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium  
 
The Nash equilibrium is inefficient for the teams and involves too much success for the weaker 
team. To see this write joint profits as 
 
(14)     π1 + π2 = (σ - w1) w1 – ct1 + (1 - w2) w2 – ct2 = (1 + σ)w1 - 2w1
2 – cT
D,    
 
Efficiency (from the point of view of the teams) requires that the share of wins allocated to each 
team maximizes joint profits. From (14) we can simply find the profit maximizing share for team 1 




2 1 ) (
t ∂
+ ∂ π π  = 1 + σ - 4w1 = 0, 
 
and hence  
 
(16)     w1
M  = (1 + σ)/4 > w1*  
 
Note that for  σ ≥ 3 the joint profit maximizing solution is for team 1 to win 100% of its games. 
Another to express these results is to note that at the Nash equilibrium the marginal revenue of a 





































showing that wins could profitably be redistributed from team 2 to team 1.  
 
Hence the quantity bidding mechanism entails “too much” competitive balance at the Nash 
equilibrium. Intuitively, this result is a consequence of asymmetry. Competition always involves an 
externality- each team’s actions under competition fails to account for the negative effect that these   7
actions have on rivals’ profits. The externality imposed by the team with the lower win percentage 
in equilibrium is bigger precisely because the big team loses more than the small team when its 
rival wins more. This is a version of Hirshleifer’s paradox of power. The “weaker” team devotes 
relatively greater resources to competition and hence ends wins more than is optimal. 
 
 
Implication 2: The attractiveness of pre-emption 
 
Dakhlia and Pecorino (2004) consider a rent-seeking model where teams not only bid for a quantity 
of talent but also submit a bid for the wage rate per unit of talent. If each team offers the same wage 
rate then the Nash equilibrium distribution of talent will be the same as above. However, if one 
team bids higher than the other it can attract all the talent, generating a corner solution. In their 
model, where teams only have a demand for winning and there is no value in competitive balance, 
they show that the dominant team will be willing to pre-empt all of the talent by offering a bid at 
with its rival’s demand for talent is zero, as long as the quantity of talent is not too great. However, 
if the supply of talent is large enough, pre-emption is not profitable, given that the team would have 
to hire all of the talent in order to pre-empt the market.
2 Here we only consider the case where the 
supply of talent is limited enough to produce an interior equilibrium where talent is paid a market 
clearing wage c* identified in (11). 
 
The incentive to pre-empt can be identified by comparing the profit level at an interior equilibrium 
for the interior market clearing marginal cost of talent, c*, with the profit made by one team raising 
price by ε above marginal cost, hiring all the talent and winning all the time. If this deviation can be 
shown to be profitable then a form of Bertrand competition will ensue. 
 
From equation (13) we know that at the interior equilibrium the profits of the dominant team is 
simply  3
2 4







= .  If team 1 pre-empts by offering a wage rate c* + ε, it acquires all the talent 
(T
S =T
D = t1* + t2*, from (10)), has a win percentage w1 = 1, and, for ε small enough, profits equal 
to 
                                                 
2 Efficiency in their model of pure rent seeking (à la Tullock) is slightly peculiar, in that the most efficient result is for 
team 1 to win all the time since it values the payoff more. Moreover, even if team 1 pre-empts all the talent, it only 
needs to employ ε of it to win with certainty, since the efficient employment level for team 2 is zero. The point here is 
that the simple rent seeking game requires more structure in order for an interior solution to be efficient. If, for example, 
there is a demand for competitive balance, then an interior solution can be efficient.   8
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Comparing (18) with (13), pre-emption can therefore be profitable if  
 
(19)  84 . 1 * 1
2 3 ≈ > ⇒ + + > σ σ σ σ σ
3 
 
Under these conditions firm 1 will start to bid up the price of talent, but at the same time firm 2 may 
also bid to retain a share of the total talent so long as it can continue to earn positive profits. Hence 
for σ > σ* we can define a pre-emption constraint for the marginal cost of talent and participation 
constraint for firm 2 to establish whether firm 2 concedes the contest (and firm 1 pre-empts): 
 
(20) Pre-emption constraint: c = c** where π1(w1 = 1, c**) = π1(w1 = w1*(σ), c**) 
 
(21) Participation constraint: π2(w2 = w2*(σ), c**) ≥ 0 
 
In other words, the pre-emption constraint requires the marginal cost of talent to be bid up to the 
point where pre-emption is no more profitable than not pre-empting (in both cases while paying 
c**), while the participation constraint requires that firm 2 is willing to pay c** and hire t2 when 
this is more profitable than exiting the contest. For σ > σ* one or other of these constraints must 
bind.  
 
 To solve for c** when (20) binds, the potential profit from pre-emption is derived from (18) while 
the profit without pre-emption depends on the value of profits at the profit maximising win 
percentage (4).  
 
(22) 
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From this we derive 
 






















The participation constraint requires 
 


































Beyond this point the participation constraint binds, and the wage level must be such that firm 2 
would not find it profitable to re-enter the contest. From (24) this requires 
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Note that, because firm 2 must still be deterred from re-entering the contest, the wage is still 
increasing in σ, even after pre-emption has occurred.  
 
Finally, note also that pre-emption reduces profits as long as 
  
(27)  π1(w1 = 1, c**) < π1(w1 = w1*(σ), c*) 
 
This is certainly true when π2 > 0, since from (20) 
 
(28)  π1(w1 = 1, c**) = π1(w1 = w1*(σ), c**) < π1(w1 = w1*(σ), c*)  
   10
Thus profits are lower when the threat of pre-emption is credible at c* even though pre-emption 
does not occur because wages are bid up to c**. This implies that firm 1 would like to commit itself 
not to pre-empt for these values of σ and so increase profits. It can also be the case that firm 1 
would prefer not to pre-empt even though it ends up doing so. Hence when π1(w1 = 1, c**) = π1(w1 
= w1*(σ), c**) and π2 = 0 we can obtain the value of σ for which π1(w1 = w1*(σ), c**) < π1(w1 = 
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which in turn implies 
 
(30)  85 . 3 ** * 1 3 3
2 3 ≈ > ⇒ + + > σ σ σ σ σ  
 
Thus for σ < σ*** firm 1 would prefer not to pre-empt. 
 
We can summarise these results as follows: 
 
Critical values  Type of equilibrium  Value of wages 
1 < σ < 1.84  Interior equilibrium 
S T









1.84 < σ < 1 + √2  Pre-emption constraint binds (wins 
distributed according to same formula as 























1 + √2 < σ < 3.85  Firm 2 makes zero profits (participation 
constraint binds), pre-emption occurs, but 
profits are lower than if firm 1 could 









** *  
σ > 3.85  Pre-emption more profitable for firm 1 








** *  
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4. Conclusions  
 
 
Hirshleifer’s paradox of power is the proposition that the strong may not get stronger in a contest, 
but may actually get weaker. The weak have an incentive to exert more effort relative to their 
resources/potential. In this paper this idea is applied to competition in a league. Conventionally it is 
argued that strong teams will become too strong – hence the need for intervention to maintain 
competitive balance in the interests of the league as a whole. The paper shows that as long as the 
dominant team is not too strong, this is unlikely to be a problem. However, once a dominant team 
has potential that is far enough in excess of rivals, there is an incentive “pre-empt” and eliminate 
competition altogether. It is perhaps this that people have in mind when they express concern over 
the dominance of very rich individuals over particular clubs.   12
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